See, ag., Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil
2. This note deals primarily with the treatment of a subclass of witnesses-experts who have not been retained by the party seeking information and who have no role in the underlying events being litigated. Although the term "expert" is inexact, the distinguishing characteristic of an expert witness is some kind of specialized skill and knowledge. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (defining an expert witness as a person with special '"knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" sufficient to qualify him as an expert on the subject to which his testimony relates). Professors Wright and Miller have classified experts into four categories: (1) experts retained or specially employed to testify at trial; (2) experts retained or employed to help prepare for trial but not to testify; (3) experts informally consulted in preparation for trial but not retained; and (4) experts whose information is not acquired in preparation for trial. 8 C. WRIG T & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAtcCE AND PROCE-DURE § 2029, at 250 (1970). Professor Graham has suggested the term "occurrence witness" to describe experts who were actors in or contemporaneous viewers of events forming the basis of a given lawsuit. Graham, supra note 1, at 941. Professor Maurer has extended this terminology and has used the term "nonoccurrence witness" to describe those experts, retained or unretained, who have not viewed or taken part in the events underlying the lawsuit. Maurer, Compelling the Expert Witness: Fairness and Utility Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 19 GA. L. REV. 71, 83 (1984) .
3. As one judge has stated: "With all the public funding presently available, in addition to the private funds available to private litigants, and consequent expansion of litigation, unwilling experts on school discrimination, environment and psychiatry, for example, as well as surgeons, could be made subject to intermittent call." Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811, 823 (2d Cir. 1976) (Gurfein, L, concurring).
4. See, e-g., Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545 , 1546 -47 (11th Cir. 1985 ) (defendant in product liability suit sought study on toxic shock syndrome); Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 558 (7th Cir. 1984 ) (manufacturer sought study on female genital cancers from university registry); Buchanan v. American Motors Corp., 697 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir. 1983 ) (defendant sought data reports, lab notes, and other material related to safety defects in jeep); be compelled to comply with a subpoena? If so, what level of compensation is appropriate?
The present approach in this area is problematic in several respects. Under existing rules, unretained experts can be forced to provide opinions or the results of research, even though a litigant may be able to obtain the information from another source. 5 Such disclosure could jeopardize the expert's ability to continue working in a given field. 6 Furthermore, the unretained expert is often inadequately compensated for the specialized information. 7 The expert's situation is rendered more difficult by the fact that in most jurisdictions a nonparty cannot appeal a discovery order in a civil suit without first being held in contempt of court. 8 Thus, an unretained expert usually must either comply with the subpoena or face contempt sanctions and then appeal. Moreover, the language in some decisions casts doubt on a nonparty's right to object to the subpoena. 9 The ABA House of Delegates passed a resolution in 198510 recommending that Rule 4511 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be amended to deal with this problem. The proposed amendment would give standing to nonparties to object to the issuance of subpoenas and would ensure that "a nonparty expert witness... not be required to give opinion testimony without compensation." 1 2 This note also advocates changing the Federal Rules to require greater solicitude for the interests of persons compelled to provide information in disputes in which they have no stake. The note suggests, however, that the ABA's proposed amendment does not go far enough. Specifically, the amendment should also provide that litigants may compel discovery or testimony fiom unretained experts only in certain limited circumstances.
The note begins by discussing how the present rules treat the competing interests of litigants and nonparty experts who do not want to participate in litigation.' 3 It demonstrates that the Federal Rules give insufficient weight to the equitable considerations associated with objections to subpoenas directed at nonparty experts. 1 4 It then explains how existing remedies are inadequate. 1 s After discussing alternative reform proposals,' 6 the note concludes by recommending that Rule 45 be amended to extend to nonparty experts protection similar to that enjoyed by attorneys under the work-produce doctrine.' 7 The proposed amendment offers a clear standard for weighing the competing policies of protecting nonparty experts from unnecessary intrusions and providing a 1976) ("The remedy of the party wishing to appeal is to refuse to answer and subject himself to criminal contempt; that of the non-party witness is to refuse to answer and subject himselfto civil or criminal contempt." Although unretained experts ostensibly have the same duties as other citizens to provide information that could be useful in resolving a dispute, 18 such experts also have a particularly strong interest in privacy. Subpoenas have been challenged on the grounds that disclosure might limit the expert's ability to conduct research, 19 cause the expert to be at a competitive disadvantage, 20 or place the unwilling expert in an uncomfortable or controversial position. 2 In addition, the minimum compensation required under the Federal Rules is insignificant compared to the potential personal and professional costs of providing the information.
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The burden imposed on the expert witness differs from that imposed on the nonexpert witness. The nonexpert witness has observed or participated in events leading to the litigation; the subpoenaed expert, in contrast, is being compelled to give opinion testimony or provide information that is the product of professional efforts.P The expert also is in a different position because his information, unlike that of a person who actually observed or participated in the events at issue, often can be supplied by someone else. Federal courts may use Rule 26 and Rule 45 to limit the information obtainable from a nonparty or to construct protective measures to reduce the burden imposed by a subpoena. 24 Both rules allow courts significant discretion when deciding whether to quash or restrict subpoenas, though neither requires that courts consider a nonparty's expertise or interest in the material sought. Furthermore, neither rule mandates that the litigant pay the unretained expert fair compensation for the information provided.
Rule 45 enables a court to weigh, to a limited extent, the interests of nonparties from whom evidence is sought. For example, Rule 45(b)(1) permits a court to modify or quash unreasonable or oppressive subpoenas. 25 If the subpoenaed nonparty submits a timely objection to the court, compliance is not required until the court rules on the motion. 26 Furthermore, Rule 45(b)(2) allows a court to quash a subpoena if the requesting party fails to advance the reasonable costs of producing the documents.
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Rule 26 sets the general standards for discovery. Parties can discover "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter" of a pending action. 28 The information sought need not be admissible at trial as long as it "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. ' 2 9 Rule 26 grants litigants liberal discovery of documentary and other information, 30 including discovery aimed at nonparty witnesses through the subpoena process. Liberal discovery, however, is tempered in some respects: the work product of lawyers is protected and the discovery of information possessed by retained experts is subject to certain restraints. 31 
Recent amendments to Rule 26 do temper liberal discovery some-
what by giving courts authority to limit discovery on practical or equitable grounds when a party abuses the process. 32 Under the amended rule, a judge may limit requests that are unreasonably burdensome, expensive, cumulative, or duplicative. 33 As a check, the amended rule requires attorneys to certify that discovery requests are made in good faith. 34 It also authorizes courts to impose sanctions for abuse of discovery. 3 5 Moreover, Rule 26(c) allows a person to seek a protective order when a discovery request is oppressive, unduly burdensome, or would result in unnecessary expense. 36 The rule, designed as a safeguard against abuses of the almost unlimited right of discovery under Rule 26, lists eight types of protective orders 37 and allows courts to establish additional protections as justice requires. Persons seeking protective orders must show good cause, 38 but courts have failed to develop a single standard for testing good cause. Some weigh the burden on the subpoenaed party against the interests of the litigant, 39 while others require more than a weighing of relative hardships. 40 In any event, the protective or- 
Id. 26(c).
37. An order may provide:
(I) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be had only on specific terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place;
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or other confidential research development or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designed way; and (8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court. der must be narrowly drawn, 41 and the nonparty expert who seeks a protective order will incur legal expenses in doing so.
In short, Rule 26 provides insufficient protection for the unretained expert. Furthermore, the rule creates a double standard by protecting the work of retained experts without extending similar protection to the work of unretained experts.
THE CHAOTic JuDIciAL ATrEMPT TO DEFiNE PROTECTIONS

FOR NONPARTY EXPERTS
Courts have disagreed sharply over how to treat nonparty experts. Even the fundamental question of whether the nonparty expert has an intellectual property right in his information remains unresolved. One judge, for example, has pointed out that an expert's knowledge is his "stock in trade." 42 So viewed, compulsion to supply such information to litigants may amount to a taking of property. Other judges have viewed privileges and relevancy requirements as the only restraints on discovery of information possessed by unretained experts. 43 But the relevancy requirement erects only a minor hurdle for litigants demanding such information, 44 and courts generally do not recognize a privilege for experts. 45 In apparent acknowledgment of the unfairness of compelling experts to comply with discovery or testimonial subpoenas, a host of tests have been employed to provide nonparties, particularly nonparty experts, with added protection. In Kaufman v. Edelstein, for example, Judge Friendly presented a list of factors designed to assist trial courts in deciding whether to compel expert testimony. 46 In his view, trial courts should consider the following: the degree to which the expert is being called because of his knowledge of facts relevant to the case rather than in order to give opinion testimony; the difference between testifying to a previously formed or expressed opinion and forming a new one; the possibility that, for other reasons, the witness is a unique expert; the extent to which the calling party is able to show the unlikelihood that any comparable witness will willingly testify; the degree to which the witness is able to show that he has been oppressed by having continually to testify. 49 an automobile manufacturer defending against a wrongfi death suit attempted to discover from an expert the research used to prepare a study on vehicle safety. 50 The district court found the subpoena unreasonably burdensome, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that authority to quash based on the expert's nonparty status rested within the discretion of the trial court. 51 In an earlier case also arising in the Sixth Circuit, Wright v. Jeep Corp., 5 2 the district court rejected an attempt by the same expert to invoke a privilege for academic research. 5 3 The court required the expert to comply with a subpoena almost identical to the one quashed in Buchanan, 5 4 holding that the burden imposed was no different from that placed on any person who acquires knowledge relevant to an issue in contention. 55 The court then invoked its power under Rule 45(b) to require the defendant to pay the expert a reasonable fee, costs, and a portion of expenses for his research. 5 6 These contrary holdings involving the same expert and information sought for identical purposes illustrate the substantial potential for capriciousness in the application of protections afforded unretained nonparty experts. The courts have not shown a willingness to develop a uniform standard. Some courts considering motions to quash have given weight 47. Id 48. Id 49. 697 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1983). 50. Id at 151. The automobile manufacturer sought discovery from the expert because it anticipated that the plaintiff would "use the research study as one basis for expressing an adverse expert opinion about the safety" of its jeeps. Id at 152.
51. Id The court also noted that compliance with the subpoena "would require the expert who has no direct connection with the litigation to spend many days testifying and disclosing all of the raw data, including thousands of documents, accumulated over the course of a long and detailed research study. DUKELAWJOURNAL [Vol. 1987:140 to the nonparty status of the person subpoenaed. will be required to submit to a subpoena. 6 2 Inconsistent decisions are disturbing because they frustrate one of the purposes of having rules of procedure. Procedural systems should treat like cases alike. 63 The problem of inconsistency in applying the federal rules to expert witnesses is not new. A similar problem existed not long ago with respect to retained expert witnesses. Before 1970, the federal courts applied a number of different tests to determine whether compulsion would be proper.6 4 One contemporary commentator observed that "no sound body of coherently related propositional law is deducible from the cases, nor have general standards employed by various courts yet fumished an adequate method of attack in this 'hazy frontier of the discovery process.' "6 Rulemakers addressed this absence of a uniform standard by revising Rule 26(b)(4) to restrict discovery of information possessed by retained experts.
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III.
CONTROLLING THE SUBPOENA PROCESS Some may argue that the nonparty expert witness has at least two potential remedies against the litigant who abuses the subpoena process. First, the nonparty expert might bring an abuse of process action against the subpoenaing party. Second, he might seek sanctions under Rule 11. As explained below, however, neither of these remedies is adequate.
A. Abuse of Process Actions.
Tort relief for abuse of process might be seen as one way to deter some abusive subpoenas. 6 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1987:140 against a party who causes harm by using a legal process to accomplish a purpose for which that process was not designed. 68 In order to sustain a cause of action, the plaintiff must show that the defendant made an improper or perverted use of the process with an ulterior motive or purpose. 69 The plaintiff must overcome substantial obstacles. Given the liberality of modem discovery rules, it will often be difficult to establish improper motive. Additionally, the plaintiff must confront the view that "our adversarial system cannot function without zealous advocacy" 70 and the practical desuetude of the tort. 7 1 Some jurisdictions require a showing that the wrongful use of process resulted in the seizure of the plaintiff's property. 72 Moreover, an action typically cannot exist until the case in which the alleged abuse occurred has been resolved.7 3 Given these hurdles, the possibility of relief on this basis offers scant comfort to the nonparty expert witness.
B. Rule 11 Sanctions.
Because Rule 1 174 sanctions are directed at the source of abusive litigation practices, they represent a limited way to protect nonparty ex- 
The Rule states in part;
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record .... A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion or other paper .... The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper;, that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existiug law or a good faith argnment for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost oflitigation.... Ifa pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable perts. Unlike tort relief, Rule 11 sanctions are available without proof of malice. 75 There is some precedent for applying sanctions to protect the interests of nonparties. In Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 76 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that Rule 11 applied to nonlitigants subpoenaed for a deposition 7 7 The court imposed Rule 11 sanctions on a party for invoking an ungrounded citation for contempt against a nonparty, former CIA Director Richard Helms, 7 after he refused to sit for a videotaped deposition even though both parties in the suit apparently had an "informal understanding" that Helms's deposition would be taped. 79 Westmoreland thus indicates that nonparty witnesses have rights beyond those agreed to by the parties and may seek sanctions under some circumstances. Nonetheless, Rule 11 may prove to be of little value to subpoenaed unretained experts. The text of Rule 11 does not mention misuse of subpoenas, which are signed by clerks rather than a party's counsel. 8 0 Broadening the sanction provision in Rule 11 to cover the misuse of subpoenas might be desirable. Whether rulemakers will change Rule 11 in light of their recent overhaul of that rule remains an open question. 3 ' In any event, the role of sanctions, particularly financial sanctions imposed against lawyers, remains controversial. 82 expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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The revised rule has replaced a vague good faith standard with one requiring something closer to objective reasonableness. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note; see also Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[The] language of the new Rule 11 explicitly and unambiguously imposes an affirmative duty on each attorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the viability of a pleading before it is signed. Simply put, subjective good faith no longer provides the safe harbor it once did."). 82. Critics of broad application of sanctions argue that sanctions not only threaten to create satellite litigation but also can inhibit lawyers' creativity and possibly chill settlements by destroying
IV. ACCOMODATION THROUGH AMENDMENT OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. The ABA's ProposaL
In 1985, the ABA House of Delegates recommended that Rule 45 be amended to address the problems associated with subpoenas issued to unretained experts. 8 3 The resolution made the following proposals:
1. That there be a limitation in the amount of expense in time and money required of a non-party witness complying with a subpoena and that any order of reimbursement of a non-party witness be prospective only.
2. That a non-party witness be afforded protection under Rules 26, 29 and 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. That the time limits for compliance with a subpoena by a non-party witness be at least the same as for a party.
4. That a party and non-party witness be given standing to object to the issuance of a subpoena.
5. That a non-party witness be given standing to object to the scope of discovery.
6. That documents in the control of a witness in one district be produced in response to a subpoena properly served upon a witness in another district.
7. That a non-party expert witness should not be required to give opinion testimony without compensation.
8. That sanctions upon a non-party withness [sic] under Rule 45 comport with the sanctions upon a party under Rule 37.
9. That the procedures of Rules 45(b), (d) and (f) be changed as to the timing of a motion for the objection, after the failure to move under Rule 45(b) and as to the failure to object and/or appear or produce pursuant to Rule 45(d).
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These principles only partially enhance protections for nonparty experts. Chiefly, the recommendations clarify rights already existing under the Federal Rules and encourage equitable treatment of parties and nonparties. In concrete terms, he proposed amendment corrects an inequity in the present rules by requiring that nonparties be given as much time to object to subpoenas as parties. The main value to subpoenaed nonparty experts, though, stems from the new standard for prospective compensation, the emphasis on limiting the burdens imposed on nonparties, and the recognition of the importance of opinion testimony.
In sum, these proposals require that special consideration be given to the particular concerns of nonparty experts. Still, the ABA recom- 88 The registry's goals included determining the incidence of the disease, discovering the relationship between prenatal treatment and other factors possibly influencing the occurrence of the disease, and determining the best means of treatment 8 9 Herbst was a nonparty to the lawsuit and the possibility of inadequate compensation for disclosure was not an issue because Squibb pledged to pay any expense that discovery required. 90 Herbst feared, however, that disclosure would jeopardize his research by forcing the termination of a study begun in 1969 and later used as the basis for the registry. 91 The court remanded the case for a reconsideration of the motion to quash the subpoena, noting that " [Squibb] appears to concede that the loss of confidentiality here will adversely affect the Registry and that, as the district judge stated, 'all society will be the poorer... [and] a unique and vital resource for learning about the incidence, causes and treatment of adenocarcinoma will be lost.' ",92 85. 740 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1984 92. IM at 560. Both the trial court and the court of appeals used balancing tests, arguably extending the requirements of the Federal Rules. The court of appeals balanced the drug company's need for information to present an adequate defense against the harm that compliance with the subpeona would cause to Herbst's registry. MkL at 559. The court held that "discovery should be no more intrusive than is necessary to avoid a miscarriage ofjustice. Anything not necessary must be viewed as covered by privilege." Mk at 565. The trial court had quashed the subpoena on the The ABA's recommendation that Rule 45 be amended to guaranty experts prospective compensation for testimony, 93 while itself insuffident, does suggest that the rules of procedure can guide courts in accomodating the conflicting interests of litigants and nonparty experts. By viewing the conflict essentially in financial terms, however, the proposal fails to ensure equitable consideration of the nonparty expert's unique position.
B. The Privilege ProposaL
One way to enhance protections for subpoenaed unretained experts would be for rulemakers to extend a privilege that would preclude the subpoenaing of opinion information or testimony. Although some state courts have adopted such a privilege, 94 federal courts view such common law privileges skeptically 95 and generally have been reluctant to expand the scope of privileges in recent years. 96 Moreover, Congress has been unwilling to standardize certain common law privileges through the Federal Rules of Evidence, 97 and the advisory notes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly reject the notion that a privilege should attach to expertise. 98 Even if such a privilege were feasible, it would be undesirable on policy grounds. Eliminating all opportunities to discover or introduce evidence that may be crucial to a lawsuit would be drastic in light of the "enormous range of 'expert' knowledge in modem life." 99
C. The Work-Product Standard.
The scope of the qualified immunity provided by the work-product grounds that the drug company's need for the information was speculative and the interest in defending itself was outweighed by the danger that the disclosure of confidential information would jeopardize the research project and similar projects. doctrine has expanded steadily. 104 As formulated in Hickman v. Taylor, 10 ' the doctrine provides a qualified immunity from discovery for any notes, working papers, memoranda, or similar materials prepared by an attorney in anticipation of litigation. 10 2 It is designed to give an attorney freedom to investigate all aspects of a case without fear of having to turn over the material to opposing counsel. 1 0 3 Such material, however, does not receive absolute protection. As one commentator notes: Information that is collected in anticipation of litigation or trial is protected from discovery, but that protection may yield to a showing of need on the part of the requesting party. Mental impressions of the attorney enjoy the highest level of protection under the work-product doctrine, but... even they may be revealed, at least in part, upon a sufficient showing. Thus, the application of the work-product rule often requires a balancing of the competing needs of the parties, as well as an inquiry into whether the material involved properly falls within the concerns that originally produced this discovery excepion.'0 A party seeking discovery must demonstrate two things when the opposing side invokes the work-product doctrine. First, the party must show a substantial need for the material.' 0 5 Second, the party must show an inability to obtain the information elsewhere without undue hardship.
10 6 Determining whether to allow discovery of information protected by the work-product doctrine thus depends largely on the availability of the material sought. The standard proposed here is modeled after this doctrine. As applied to the unretained expert, the proposed standard would require the litigant to show a substantial need for the material and an inability to obtain the material or testimony elsewhere without undue hardship. In addition, in accord with the ABA recommendation, the subpoenaing party would be required to provide the nonparty with reasonable compensation on a prospective basis.
A court should conclude that the subpoenaed information is not available elsewhere if the subpoenaing party shows that it has exhausted all reasonable efforts to obtain it. This showing would require an affirtma-100. Under the work-product doctrine, material prepared by one party or for one party's representative is protected from discovery, unless the party seeking it can show a substantial need for the information and is unable to obtain it elsewhere without undue hardship. FED. IL CIv. P. 26(b)(3). 101. 329 U.S. 495 (1947 tive act on the part of the subpoenaing party that may vary depending on the circumstances of the litigation. The party might, for example, be required to seek comparable information from other experts. In other cases, a court might require the party to attempt to duplicate the research with his own resources.
Of course, this proposal will not solve every problem. Like any balancing standard, it cannot be applied mechanically. But the limited flexibility of the proposed rule is also one of its strengths. Within clear limits, designed to enhance fairness and consistency in the subpoenaing process, judges could weigh the relative burdens imposed on litigants and nonparties. 108 Although the relevant considerations will vary from case to case, the proposed standard would limit judicial discretion and narrow the wide discrepancies that result from the application of present standards.
-V.
CONCLUSION
The ABA and a number of judges recognize that nonparty experts subpoenaed to provide information or testimony based on their expertise should be accorded protection from unfair appropriation of their special knowledge. No clear standard to ensure consideration of the interests of experts compelled to provide information has emerged, however. Moreover, there is little chance that courts will develop a consistent, equitable standard under the current versions of Rules 45 and 26.
The ABA has recognized the problem and has proposed that Rule 45 be amended. This note has argued that the ABA proposal would do little to resolve the problem. Accordingly, the note proposes that Rule 45 be amended to provide specific protection for nonparty experts comparable to that available to attorneys under the work-product doctrine. The amended rule would clarify the standards applicable to subpoenaing nonparty experts and curtail the confusion and inconsistent treatment of nonparty experts. Moreover, it would be in accord with the emphasis on fairness mandated by the Federal Rules and with the goal of encouraging liberal access to relevant information.
Mark Labaton
108. In addition, other societal interests may be considered. For example, Judge Edelstein based his decision to uphold subpeonas to two nonparty computer experts in one case in part on the importance that the case had for the nation. 
